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The objective of this paper is to investigate the role of social capital in for-profit People-to-People 
(P2P) lending marketplaces such as Prosper, the largest P2P lending marketplace in the US. We 
examine whether marketplace members (lenders, borrowers) are able to capitalize on borrowers' 
accumulated social capital. From a borrower's perspective, we investigate the influence of social 
capital on borrowers' chances to obtain funding and better interest rates in general as well as by 
borrower groups and over time. From a lender's perspective, we investigate the influence of 
borrowers' social capital on loan payment. We use data over a time span of two and a half years 
from Prosper, and analyze more than 200,000 loan requests and 27,500 loans. Our results suggest 
that social capital does not provide equal benefits to all members of Prosper and that mechanisms 
to promote social capital should be carefully designed. 
Keywords:  Online communities, E-finance, Electronic markets, P2P lending marketplaces 
Web-based Information Systems and Applications 
2 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix 2009  
Introduction 
People-to-people (P2P) lending (also called Peer-to-Peer or social lending) allows individuals to lend and borrow 
directly among each other without the mediation of a creditor bank institution. P2P lending marketplaces act as 
brokerages and help to connect people in need of money with people who want to invest money. P2P lending 
marketplaces use Web technologies to facilitate the transactions between the borrowers and lenders from the start of 
a loan request (e.g., match-making, searching for loan requests) until a loan matures (e.g., re-payment activities, 
collection activities). Borrowers would register at a P2P lending marketplace and provide some basic background 
data to the marketplace. Once approved, the borrower would create and publish a loan request (called listing) that 
describes the purpose and conditions of the desired loan. Lenders on the marketplace can search for listings and then 
bid on listings that are attractive to them and promise an adequate return on their investment. If the listing gets 
funded a loan is created and the P2P lending marketplace regulates the payment activities and, if necessary, takes 
measure when a loan becomes delinquent (i.e., is overdue). 
The Harvard Business Review announced P2P lending to be one of the 20 breakthrough ideas for 2009 (Sviokla 
2009), suggesting that the bank and credit crisis in 2008/2009 would stimulate the growth of lower risk P2P loans. 
However, profit-oriented online P2P lending marketplaces can still be considered to be in their early stage of 
evolution. Zopa UK, the oldest online P2P lending marketplace launched in 2005 
(uk.zopa.com/ZopaWeb/public/help/help-faqs-interested.html), Prosper, the oldest US P2P lending marketplace, 
launched in 2006 (www.prosper.com/about/), and US second largest P2P lending marketplace Lending Club 
launched in 2007 (www.lendingclub.com/info/about-us.action). Since their launch, P2P lending marketplaces 
enjoyed a considerable growth rate in loan requests, loans, and member development (see Figure 1). 
 
  
Figure 1: Loan Originations for US P2P Lending Marketplaces Prosper and Lending Club (Source: 
www.prosper.com, www.lendingclub.com) 
 
P2P lending marketplaces claim that both borrowers and lenders can profit from P2P lending: borrowers are able to 
get better interest rates and lenders are able to reduce their risk and increase their returns on their investment by 
selecting their investments (i.e., borrower loans) themselves (Chris Larsen, CEO of Prosper in Hof (2006), Said 
(2006)). After two and a half years since the launch of Prosper's platform, more reliable information about loan 
performance is becoming available. As Prosper's loan duration is 36 months, time is needed for the borrowers to 
show how serious they take their responsibilities and pay back the loans in a timely manner. Table 1 shows the loan 
status (i.e., the percentage of loans that are paid and current, late, more than 4 months late, and defaulted) of loans 
with age 20 to 30 months. It is striking to note that around 35% of the loans are in some kind of delinquency. These 
numbers suggest that investing in P2P lending can be a risky business and that lenders need to pick the loans they 
want to invest in carefully. The numbers also suggest that P2P lending marketplaces should strive to help lenders 
make good investment decisions. 
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Table 1: Loan Performance for Prosper Loans by Loan Age
1
 (Source: www.prosper.com as of October 2008) 
Loan Age  
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Paid, Current 66% 66% 66% 63% 64% 66% 65% 66% 67% 71% 66% 
Late 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 4% 1% 5% 5% 
4+ months late 18% 15% 14% 16% 11% 13% 11% 10% 11% 10% 6% 
Defaulted 12% 14% 16% 17% 20% 18% 21% 19% 21% 14% 23% 
 
The fundamental problem in online P2P lending is information asymmetry between the lenders and the borrowers. 
The lenders have less information about the borrowers’ capabilities and willingness to pay back than the borrowers 
do. Hence, similar to Akerlof's example of the automobile market (Akerlof 1970), a lender does not know whether a 
loan will turn out to be a good investment (if the loan is paid back on time) or a "lemon" (if the loan becomes 
delinquent at any time before reaching maturity). Also, a borrower might have an incentive to misrepresent and 
overstate his/her ability and willingness to pay back for the sake of a lower interest rate.  In such a market, if lenders 
are not able to distinguish the good loans from the lemons, adverse selection - good loans are driven out by lemons - 
may lead to a market failure (Akerlof 1970). Borrowers, on the other hand, need to convince the lenders that they are 
creditworthy candidates for loans. 
We look at a particular source of information for borrowers to demonstrate their trustworthiness, namely, social 
capital. Banks use elaborate evaluation methods to evaluate borrowers’ risk levels and include social factors in their 
risk evaluations to get more reliable risk assessments (Ferrary 2003). Similarly, group lending in microfinance rely 
on borrowers’ social connections, such as group membership, to mitigate certain risks (Cassar et al. 2007; Everett 
2008; Karlan 2007). However, in both examples, the relationships relied on for risk assessment are often very 
personal and include face-to-face contact. In contrast, the borrowers and the lenders in P2P lending marketplaces are 
often strangers and have limited personal and usually no face-to-face contact. Therefore, it is particularly 
challenging for P2P lending marketplaces to help borrowers build social capital. 
P2P lending marketplaces have developed several ways to foster social capital. For example, Prosper uses two 
fundamental ways to build social connections among its members (www.prosper.com/connections). First, Prosper 
allows their members to connect with each other by creating networks of friends and endorsing each other. Second, 
Prosper borrowers and lenders are able to join groups which are lead by a group leader. Smava, a P2P lending 
marketplace in Germany, also uses a group system to allow its members to connect with each other 
(www.smava.de/Gemeinschaft+Aktivitaeten.html). In Lending Club, a lender is able to see whether s/he and the 
borrower have a shared background, for example, whether they live close to each other or went to the same school 
(www.lendingclub.com/browse/browseLoans.action). In addition, Smava and Zopa UK facilitate forums for their 
members to share their experiences, stories, and advise. On the one hand, these features allow marketplace 
participants to connect to each other. On the other hand, the features show whether and how a borrower is connected 
within the community of the P2P lending marketplace, i.e., it shows the borrower's social capital. In this paper, we 
focus on the social capital of the borrowers and investigate how the participants of P2P lending can benefit from this 
asset. Our research questions encompass: 
- What is the role of social capital in P2P lending? 
- How can borrowers benefit from social capital? 
- How can lenders benefit from social capital? 
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we contribute to the social capital theory by investigating the role of 
social capital in an online community of transaction. There is evidence of benefits of social capital in online 
communities of practice (e.g., knowledge sharing (Law and Chang 2008), collaboration in opens source 
communities (Tan et al. 2007; Wang 2005), but less work has been done in online communities of transaction. 
Second, we contribute to the emerging literature in P2P lending marketplaces by analyzing social capital and its 
                                                          
1 Lending Club loans are not mature enough to provide reliable data. 
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benefits for both lenders and borrowers in more depth. Previous research looked at groups as intermediaries in P2P 
lending (Berger and Gleisner 2009), the operation and effectiveness of the Prosper P2P lending marketplace (Kumar 
2007), trust-building mechanisms (Greiner and Wang 2007), Zopa UK P2P lending marketplace (Ortega and Bell 
2008), the potential of P2P lending to create a more competitive credit market (Garman et al. 2008), groups and loan 
performances (Everett 2008), and social networks (Freedman and Jin 2008). We add to this line of research by 
looking specifically at the role of social capital from both the borrowers’ and lenders’ perspectives and also 
investigate different groups of borrowers and the development of social capital benefits over time. Third, our results 
give insights into the mechanics of social connections in P2P lending marketplaces and help to design better P2P 
lending marketplaces. 
The paper is composed as follows. First, we introduce social capital theory and how social capital is represented in 
P2P marketplace Prosper. We continue by looking at the benefits that borrowers and lenders derive from social 
capital and develop our hypotheses. Second, we describe the methods we used to test our hypotheses and present the 
results. In the third section, we discuss some of the salient insights we gained from the results. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Social Capital Theory 
Social capital theory goes back to the notion of the "embeddedness" of economic behavior which suggests that 
economic behavior should not be analyzed without considering the constraints of ongoing social relations between 
individuals (Granovetter 1985). This is in contrast to classical and neoclassical economics' assumption of a 
competitive marketplace with autonomous actors acting independently from their social connections (Granovetter 
1985). Conversely, social capital theory’s central proposition is that an individual’s network of relationships can 
provide a valuable resource for conducting social affairs (Bourdieu 1986; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Social 
capital can provide the members of a social network with “the backing of collectively-owned capital, a ‘credential’ 
which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word” (Bourdieu 1986, p.51). Social capital is an 
"umbrella concept" (Adler and Kwon 2002) and lacks a consistent definition. For our study, we adopt the definition 
of social capital from Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 243) who define social capital as the "sum of the actual and 
potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by 
an individual or social unit". This definition encompasses the social network as well as the assets and resources that 
can be accessed and mobilized through the network (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Social capital is a multi-
dimensional construct. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) identified three main dimensions of social capital, namely 
structural, relational, and cognitive. The structural dimension describes whether and how people or entities are 
connected. Important aspects of the structural dimension are the presence or absence of network ties between 
people, network configuration (e.g., centralization or density), and appropriability (i.e., transferability of social 
capital to other contexts). The relational dimension of social capital describes the set of personal relationships that 
people have developed through interactions. The relational dimension focuses on the quality of relations such as 
respect and friendship between people. Important aspects are trust and trustworthiness, norms and sanctions, 
obligations and expectations, and identity and identification. The cognitive dimension relates to resources providing 
shared representation, interpretations, and systems of meanings. Important aspects are shared languages shared 
narratives that enable individuals within a network to have similar interpretations of events. 
Social Capital in P2P Lending Marketplace Prosper 
Social capital can take on many forms (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998) and should be set in its context. We want to 
investigate what forms social capital may take on in P2P lending marketplace Prosper. As described above, social 
capital is about the presence and configurations of social connections and networks between individuals. Prosper 
offers the following two basic mechanisms to foster social connections: groups and personal connections. 
Groups are the first source of social capital in P2P lending marketplace Prosper. Prosper allows borrowers and 
lenders to join together in groups which can be created by any member of Prosper. Each group is lead by a group 
leader (usually the one who founds the group) whose tasks may include giving advice and suggestions to their group 
members, pre-screening potential borrowers before they join the group, making recommendations to potential 
lenders, and providing information about a particular borrower to lenders. Each group on Prosper is given a star 
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rating based on the loan performance of all loans associated with the group. Higher rated groups indicate that the 
loans of their group members outperform an expected default rate and a group's low star rating shows that their 
loans under perform. Groups may reflect all three dimensions of social capital identified by Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998). First, they represent a social network between marketplace members that enable communication and provide 
access to information a borrower not connected to a group. Second, group membership may lead to additional norms 
and sanctions from other group members that might change the behavior and actions of a group member. Third, 
groups are often created around a common theme such as alumni affiliation, occupation, lending purpose etc. These 
may provide a common background and encourage shared language, and shared meaning among groups. 
Personal connections between Prosper members can be a second source of social capital. Prosper allows its members 
to declare each other as friends and form networks of friends. These friend networks can show that the member is 
embedded in a social network within the marketplace. Prosper members are also able to recommend or endorse 
other members and providing more personal information about the member. Friends and endorsements connect 
Prosper members together in a less formal structure than groups offer; however, can still provide benefits. For 
example, a lender might perceive a borrower who has endorsements to be more creditworthy compared to a 
borrower with no perceived connection to other Prosper members. 
Benefits of Social Capital to Borrowers 
The first benefit of social capital that we want to discuss concerns the problem of a borrower to be able to signal 
creditworthiness to potential lenders. As discussed above, an important challenge for lenders is to differentiate the 
good listings from the "lemons" in the marketplace and to invest in listings that promise to being paid back by the 
borrower. The problem is information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders and that lenders need cues to 
evaluate whether a borrower is likely or not likely to pay back the future loan. 
Berger and Gleisner (2009) argue that groups can play the role of intermediaries in P2P lending marketplaces by 
taking on several duties to reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. However, not all groups 
are created equal. Some groups require the listings to be pre-screened by the group leader to sort out bad loans that 
could hurt the group's reputation. Borrowers might send important documents and evidence about their economic 
background to the group leader. Thus, the group leader may have information about the borrower that go beyond of 
what the borrower reveal in their listing. With the number of listings offered on Prosper (252 new listings on 
average per day in 2007; this number excludes canceled and withdrawn listings) lenders are not able to contact each 
borrower themselves and request additional information. This task can be taken on by the group leader. Thus, 
borrowers who are part of a group - especially once who require pre-screening of the borrower – might be perceived 
of better risk than borrowers who are not. By membership in a group, borrowers may signal that they are 
creditworthy candidates for a loan. 
Groups may provide another benefit from social capital for the borrower concerning signaling of creditworthiness 
(Greiner and Wang 2007). Groups are motivated to discipline members who are cheating because misbehavior of a 
single member could potentially harm other members and the group as a collective. Therefore, a group’s reputation 
can serve as a proxy for determining an individual’s creditworthiness (Ba and Pavlou 2002). Since Prosper groups 
are evaluated based on the repayment history of their loans, group members might be very interested to see their 
fellow members fulfill their payment obligations. Hence, lenders might infer from the group performance to that of 
the individual group member. Lenders might also believe that the group members will socially influence the group 
member to pay their loan in order to keep a good star rating. Thus, membership in a group with a good rating might 
signal creditworthiness (Greiner and Wang 2007). Prosper also allows lenders to support one or several groups. 
Being member of a group with many supporting lenders might signal trustworthiness, too. 
Another benefit of social capital is access and exchange of information between group members (Adler and Kwon 
2002; Coleman 1988). Groups may share their experience and knowledge among their group members. Group 
members are thus able to draw on the collective knowledge of the group. Group members in Prosper may have 
access to advice for the whole loan process: from the creation of a listing to help when problems arise after the loan 
is created. The volume of social capital depends on the size of an individual's network (Bourdieu 1986) which 
suggests that groups of different sizes provide different benefits to their members. Members of a large group have a 
larger collective knowledge stock to draw from than members of small groups. However, the quality of this 
knowledge depends on how much experience the groups have (Everett 2008). For example, a Prosper group with 
300 members and 10 created loans might have less experience and knowledge than a group with 20 members and 30 
Web-based Information Systems and Applications 
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loans. A member’s place within the structure may also influence access and exchange of knowledge. A group leader 
is in the center of group activity and should therefore be able to get most benefits from the collective knowledge. 
The personal social network of friends and endorsements at Prosper might also help a borrower to signal 
creditworthiness. Reputation of a seller is a determinant of creditworthiness in C2C purchasing behavior (McKnight 
et al. 2002; Melnik and Alm 2002; Strader and Ramaswami 2002). Similarly in P2P lending marketplaces, if others 
perceive the borrower to be trustworthy, the lender might believe in these qualities of the borrower as well (Greiner 
and Wang 2007). The size of the friend and endorsement network might increase the strength of this 
creditworthiness signal since it shows that other members have shown trust in the borrower (Greiner and Wang 
2007). Another strong signal of trust might be if the friend, endorsement giver, group member, or group leader 
makes a bid on the listing thus showing that they trust the borrower (Freedman and Jin 2008). This suggest that an 
individual's personal relationships to others and social networks have the potential to be a basis for trust and for 
transferring and revealing trust (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Shapiro 1987). Based on above discussion, we 
conclude that lenders might interpret social capital of the borrower as a creditability signal in their decision to invest 
money and preferably bid on borrowers with a higher social capital. Previous studies also suggest that social 
networks help borrowers to get a better interest rate (Berger and Gleisner 2009; Freedman and Jin 2008). We 
propose: 
H1: Social capital has a positive influence on the likelihood of getting funded 
H2: Social capital reduces the interest rates a borrower is able to obtain 
We believe that borrowers do not receive equal benefits from social capital. As mentioned above, lenders might use 
several cues to evaluate the creditworthiness of a listing - economic, social, and the listing itself. As previous 
research demonstrates, economic cues and in particular credit grades have an important influence on a lender's 
funding decision (Greiner and Wang 2007). Credit grades are based on the reported Experian credit scores and 
reflect a borrower's past history of payment performance and lender can predict future payment performance based 
on this data. Listings with lower credit grades can cause doubts whether the borrower is able and willing to re-pay 
the loan. At the same time, however, these loans suggest the highest nominal payback. The following table 2 shows 
the interest rates and delinquencies rates by credit grade for Prosper. This means that a good evaluation of the 
borrower's listing becomes even more essential if a lender decides to invest in higher risk listings. We propose that a 
lender will pay closer attention to a borrower's social capital when evaluating higher risk listings compared to lower 
risk listings. 
H3: Social capital has an increasing influence with lower credit grade on the likelihood of getting funded and the 
interest rate a borrower is able to obtain 
Table 2: Interest Rates and Loan Performance for Prosper Listings with Loan Age between 20 and 30 months 
by Credit Grade (Source: www.prosper.com as of October 2008) 
  AA A B C D E HR 
# of Loans 643 583 765 1103 1233 1430 1603 
Loan Amount $4,425,349 $4,828,179  $6,089,673 $7,265,744 $6,255,984 $5,314,797 $3,885,140 
Avg. Interest 
Rate 
9.3% 11.1% 14.0% 16.8% 20.2% 24.2% 24.2% 
Current, Paid 92% 83% 80% 73% 70% 56% 41% 
Late 1% 4% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 
4 + Late 4% 6% 8% 14% 11% 15% 20% 
Defaulted 2% 5% 8% 10% 14% 23% 34% 
 
Social capital can be studied on the different levels of analysis such as individual, community, or nations level 
(Wang 2005). We are investigating social capital on an individual level and assess the influence of a marketplace 
member's social capital and the benefits derived from it. However, in the case of P2P lending marketplace, an 
individual's level of social capital is likely to depend on the level of social capital of the community as a whole. 
Groups as well as personal connections within the marketplace need be established and their group size grow over 
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time. Group ratings reflect the past performances of group member loans and thus will become more accurate and 
reliable over time as loans mature. So, there can be an argument made that social capital, of the community as well 
as of the individual, need time to grow in newly established communities such as Prosper. Thus, we conclude that 
social capital's influence on the likelihood of getting funded and obtaining lower interest rates will increase over 
time. 
H4: Social capital has an increasing influence over time on the likelihood of getting funded and the interest rate a 
borrower is able to obtain 
Benefits of Social Capital for Lenders 
The main benefit lenders should obtain from a borrower's social capital is its influence on actual loan performance 
(Berger and Gleisner 2009). We argued above that borrower might be able to signal creditworthiness to lenders and 
that lenders might incorporate the borrower's social capital in their investment decisions. However, these cues only 
give lenders a benefit if they are really able to differentiate between the good and the bad loans. Only then can social 
capital help in a lender's investment decision. We discussed above that social capital can provide three benefits, 
namely, pre-selection of better listings by group leaders, knowledge and experience exchange between group 
members, and social pressure from group members and the social networks on the borrower to pay back on time. 
These three benefits of social capital should increase the payment performance of the borrower. This positive effect 
should have an even higher influence if the friends, endorsement giver, group members, or group leaders of the 
borrower’s group have a stake in the loan. If the personal connections of a borrower also invested in the loan, a 
borrower might feel more obligated to pay back his/her loan on time. We therefore conclude: 
H5: Social capital has a positive influence on loan payment 
Method 
Description of Dependent Variables, Independent Variables, and Control Variables 
Most of the dependent and independent variables were selected based on prior literature. As discussed in the 
previous section, a borrower has two major sources of social capital: group membership and the support from his/her 
social network (i.e., friends, endorsement givers, the group leader, and other group members). We focus on four 
group characteristics: the rating of a group, whether a review is required before joining a group, the number of group 
loans per group member (as a proxy of the experience of the group), and the number of lenders who support the 
group. We focus on four social network variables: the number of endorsements, whether a listing has a bid from the 
members of the borrower’s social network, whether the borrower is a group leader himself/herself, and the 
percentage of a loan that is funded by the borrower’s social network. Table 3 gives an overview of the dependent 
variables and social capital independent variables. 
 
Table 3: Description of Dependent and Social Capital Measures 
Variable Name Description Resource (if applicable) Used in 
Dependent Variables 
Likelihood of 
Getting Funded  
The percentage amount of the listing which has 
been funded. This can be calculated by dividing 
amount received / amount requested. [Continuous] 
Greiner and Wang (2007)  H1, H3, 
H4 
Spread above Prime 
Rate  
Difference of borrower rate and Wall Street 
Journal Prime Rate. [Continuous] 
 Adapted from Everett 




Loan Status The status of the loan. [Ordinal: 0 = defaulted, 1= 
4+ months late, 2 = up to 4 months late, and 3 = 
current and paid] 
Adapted from Kumar 
(2007), Everett (2008) 
H5 
Web-based Information Systems and Applications 
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Independent Variables 
Group Rating  The rating of the associated group. [Ordinal; -1 = 
no group, 0 = low to 5 = high star rating] 
Greiner and Wang (2007), 
Berger and Gleisner 





1 if a group’s loan listing requires review by group 
leader. [Categorical 1=Yes, 0= No] 
Berger and Gleisner 
(2009), Everett (2008), 
Freedman and Jin (2008) 
H1-H5 
Number of Group 
Loans per Member 
Number of loans issued in the group per group 
member at the time of listing to serve as a proxy 
for experience and effective size of group. 
[Continuous] 
Adapted from Everett 
(2008)  
H1-H5 
Number of Lenders 
Supporting Group 





Number of endorsements or recommendation a 
borrower has. [Continuous] 
Adapted from Greiner and 
Wang (2007), Freedman 
and Jin (2008) 
H1-H5 
Bid from Social 
Network 
Whether a listing has a bid from a friend, an 
endorsement giver, group leader, or group member 
of the borrower. [Categorical 1=Yes, 0= No] 
Adapted from Freedman 
and Jin (2008), Berger 
(2009)  
H1-H5 
Is Group Leader 
Whether the borrower is a group leader. 
[Categorical 1=Yes, 0= No] 
 
H1-H5 
% funds from 
Social Network  
Total dollar of winning bids made by friends, 
endorsement givers, group leader, or group 
member divided by total dollar of winning bids. 
[Continuous] 
Adapted from Freedman 




In addition, to social capital, borrowers at Prosper have two other ways to demonstrate creditworthiness. First, 
Prosper gathers borrowers’ economic background data (such as credit scores, income and debt information) that can 
be used to assess their abilities to pay back loans. Second, the borrowers can use the listings of loans to present 
themselves. A listing may include images, description of the loan purpose, and amount of the loan. Most of the 
control variables are identified in previous research as improving a borrower's access to credit and lowering interest 
rates (Berger and Gleisner 2009; Everett 2008; Freedman and Jin 2008; Greiner and Wang 2007; Kumar 2007): 
credit grade [1=HR (High Risk), 2=E, 3=D, 4=C, 5=B, 6=A, 7=AA], debt-to-income ratio [Continuous], whether the 
borrower is a homeowner [Categorical 1=Yes, 0= No], the maximum rate the borrower is willing to borrow at 
[Continuous], the amount requested [Continuous], whether the listing has an image [Categorical 1=Yes, 0= No], the 
length of the listing description [Continuous], whether the borrower had a previously successful listing [Categorical 
1=Yes, 0= No], and the duration a listing is open for bidding [Continuous]. In contrast to social capital, these 
variables either describe the economic situation of the borrower or the listing itself and are thus different from social 
capital which lies in the social ties of a borrower. 
Sample Description 
We used data from Prosper.com, the largest P2P lending marketplace in the US. The data is publicly available on 
Prosper’s Website. Additional verifications and data were collected by browsing Prosper’s public listing, group, and 
member web pages. The sample contains loan requests from Prosper’s launch on 2/13/2006 to the start of Prosper's 
quiet period2 on 10/12/2008. First, listings that were withdrawn or canceled were deleted, leaving only listings that 
either expired (i.e., didn’t get enough bids to get funded) or completed (i.e., listings were funded and converted to a 
                                                          
2 Prosper halted business for six months to register with the SEC. Business resumed in May 2009. 
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loan). Second, listings with unknown debt-to-income ratio were deleted. Also removed were listings with credit 
grades of NC (no credit; discontinued). Third, the correct group rating and endorsements at the time of listing were 
calculated. Fourth, other measures, such as group characteristics, were added. The final sample consists of 201,885 
listings, of which 27,633 were fully funded and became loans. Three samples were drawn from these listings to test 
the five hypotheses. 
 
Table 4: Description and Correlations for Sample used to Test H1, H3(a), and H4(a) 
n = 201,885 (all listings) Min Max Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Likelihood of Getting Funded 0 100 18.4 34.4
2 Group Rating -1 5 -0.2 1.6 .11 ***
3 Group Requires Listing Review 0 1 0.1 0.3 .16 *** .54 ***
4 No of Group Loans per Group M ember 0 13 0.0 0.3 .08 *** .23 *** .29 ***
5 Number of Lenders Supporting Group 0 911 54.4 126.1 .10 *** .59 *** .42 *** .26 ***
6 Number of Endorsements 0 23 0.2 0.6 .13 *** .19 *** .20 *** .07 *** .13 ***
7 Has Bid from Social Network 0 1 0.1 0.3 .28 *** .34 *** .39 *** .16 *** .36 *** .27 ***
8 Is Group Leader 0 1 0.0 0.1 .08 *** .03 *** .03 *** .01 *** .04 *** .05 *** .04 ***
9 Credit Grade 1 7 2.4 1.6 .44 ***-.02 *** .02 *** .01 ***-.02 *** .04 *** .08 *** .09 ***
10 Debt to Income Ratio 0 1001 50.0 129.7 -.06 *** .01 *** .01 ** .00 n.s. .00 n.s. .01 ** .00 * .00 n.s. .01 ***
11 Is Borrower Homeowner 0 1 0.3 0.5 .10 ***-.02 ***-.01 *** .00 * -.01 *** .01 *** .01 *** .03 *** .30 *** .00 n.s.
12 Borrower M aximum Rate 0 49.75 19.5 8.8 .12 ***-.04 ***-.01 *** .00 n.s. -.03 *** .03 *** .01 ***-.04 ***-.18 ***-.03 ***-.04 ***
13 Amount Requested 1000 25000 7031.3 6126.1 -.06 ***-.03 ***-.02 ***-.01 ***-.04 *** .02 *** .00 n.s. .01 *** .34 *** .09 *** .19 ***-.13 ***
14 Listing has Image 0 1 0.5 0.5 .15 *** .14 *** .13 *** .06 *** .12 *** .17 *** .14 *** .05 *** .07 ***-.02 ***-.01 * .06 *** .00 n.s.
15 Length of Listing Description 0 3994 1009.9 720.6 .15 *** .24 *** .23 *** .11 *** .22 *** .24 *** .27 *** .04 ***-.01 ** -.01 *** .00 * .10 *** .02 *** .34 ***
16 Previous Successful Listings -1 0 0.0 0.2 -.13 ***-.08 ***-.05 ***-.08 ***-.10 ***-.07 ***-.01 ***-.09 ***-.10 *** .02 ***-.05 ***-.05 *** .02 ***-.07 ***-.08 ***
17 Listing Duration 0 14 7.3 1.9 .04 *** .09 *** .09 *** .05 *** .08 *** .08 *** .09 *** .02 *** .01 ***-.01 ** -.03 ***-.02 *** .08 *** .09 *** .11 ***-.01 ***
*** p< .001, ** p <.01, * p<.05, n.s. = not significant; SD = Standard Deviation  
 
Table 5: Description and Correlations for Sample used to Test H2, H3(b), and H4(b) 
n = 27,633 (No of Loans) Min Max Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Spread Above Prime Rate -8 42 11.3 7.6
2 Group Rating -1 5 0.1 2.0 -.03 ***
3 Group Requires Listing Review 0 1 0.2 0.4 -.04 *** .55 ***
4 No of Group Loans per Group Member 0 13 0.1 0.3 .00 n.s. .32 *** .41 ***
5 Number of Lenders Supporting Group 0 911 78.9 153.1 -.03 *** .59 *** .47 *** .34 ***
6 Number of Endorsements 0 23 0.4 0.9 .00 n.s. .23 *** .26 *** .12 *** .14 ***
7 Has Bid from Social Network 0 1 0.3 0.4 -.07 *** .44 *** .49 *** .25 *** .44 *** .32 ***
8 Is Group Leader 0 1 0.0 0.2 -.13 *** .02 ** .00 n.s. .00 n.s. .01 * .03 *** .01 n.s.
9 Credit Grade 1 7 3.9 1.8 -.68 *** -.13 *** -.12 *** -.07 *** -.11 *** -.05 *** -.15 *** .09 ***
10 Debt to Income Ratio 0 1001 32.5 93.4 .02 ** .07 *** .08 *** .06 *** .05 *** .07 *** .08 *** .01 n.s. .02 **
11 Is Borrower Homeowner 0 1 0.4 0.5 -.18 *** -.03 *** -.05 *** -.02 *** -.02 *** -.01 n.s. -.05 *** .04 *** .35 *** .02 ***
12 Amount Requested 1000 25000 6173.1 5565.7 -.17 *** .04 *** .05 *** .04 *** .05 *** .09 *** .06 *** .01 n.s. .42 *** .07 *** .25 ***
13 Listing has Image 0 1 0.7 0.5 -.01 * .13 *** .13 *** .07 *** .11 *** .16 *** .14 *** .04 *** -.03 *** .03 *** -.04 *** .07 ***
14 Length of Listing Description 0 3938 1229.3 812.6 .12 *** .26 *** .26 *** .14 *** .23 *** .24 *** .29 *** .00 n.s. -.22 *** .07 *** -.07 *** .07 *** .32 ***
15 Previous Successful Listings -1 0 -0.1 0.3 -.03 *** -.03 *** .02 ** -.06 *** -.04 *** -.04 *** .05 *** -.06 *** -.03 *** .01 n.s. -.04 *** .00 n.s. -.02 *** -.01 n.s.
16 Listing Duration 3 14 7.5 1.9 -.03 *** .14 *** .14 *** .08 *** .13 *** .11 *** .16 *** .03 *** -.03 *** .02 *** -.04 *** .11 *** .10 *** .15 *** .00 n.s.
*** p< .001, ** p <.01, * p<.05, n.s. = not significant; SD = Standard Deviation  
 
Table 6: Description and Correlations for Sample used to Test H5 
n =14,417 (loan age > 12 months) Min Max Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Loan Payment 0 3 2.4 1.1
2 Group Rating -1 5 0.7 2.2 .00 n.s.
3 Group Requires Listing Review 0 1 0.3 0.5 -.01 n.s. .48 ***
4 No of Group Loans per Group Member 0 11 0.1 0.3 -.03 ** .25 *** .36 ***
5 Number of Lenders Supporting Group 0 911 127.7 179.5 -.02 * .61 *** .41 *** .27 ***
6 Number of Endorsements 0 23 0.4 0.9 .02 ** .24 *** .28 *** .11 *** .18 ***
7 Has Bid from Social Network 0 1 0.4 0.5 -.02 ** .36 *** .42 *** .20 *** .43 *** .30 ***
8 Is Group Leader 0 1 0.1 0.2 .09 *** -.03 ** -.04 *** -.03 *** -.03 *** .00 n.s. -.04 ***
9 % of Loan Funded by Social Network 0 100 3.3 12.4 -.02 * .02 * .16 *** .06 *** -.01 n.s. .12 *** .31 *** -.02 **
10 Credit Grade 1 7 3.6 1.9 .33 *** -.06 *** -.08 *** -.03 *** -.05 *** -.02 n.s. -.11 *** .14 *** -.15 ***
11 Debt to Income Ratio 0 1001 37.4 118.5 -.01 n.s. .05 *** .07 *** .06 *** .03 *** .07 *** .06 *** .00 n.s. .04 *** .03 ***
12 Is Borrower Homeowner 0 1 0.4 0.5 .06 *** .00 n.s. -.03 *** .00 n.s. .02 * .01 n.s. -.03 *** .07 *** -.06 *** .33 *** .03 ***
13 Borrower Maximum Rate 0 49.75 19.8 6.4 -.33 *** .04 *** .04 *** .04 *** .05 *** .05 *** .03 *** -.15 *** -.11 *** -.73 *** .04 *** -.20 ***
14 Amount Requested 1000 25000 6122.6 5564.4 .03 ** .07 *** .07 *** .05 *** .09 *** .13 *** .08 *** .01 n.s. -.07 *** .39 *** .08 *** .24 *** -.07 ***
15 Listing has Image 0 1 0.7 0.5 .00 n.s. .15 *** .16 *** .08 *** .13 *** .16 *** .17 *** .04 *** .01 n.s. -.04 *** .03 *** -.04 *** .01 n.s. .08 ***
16 Length of Listing Description 0 3938 1333.8 879.6 -.08 *** .23 *** .24 *** .12 *** .21 *** .24 *** .30 *** -.04 *** .08 *** -.24 *** .07 *** -.07 *** .21 *** .09 *** .33 ***
17 Previous Successful Listings -1 0 0.0 0.2 -.05 *** -.02 n.s. .00 n.s. -.03 *** -.02 * .00 n.s. .00 n.s. -.08 *** .00 n.s. -.05 *** .00 n.s. -.04 *** .05 *** -.07 *** .01 n.s. .02 *
18 Listing Duration 3 14 7.7 2.1 -.02 * .12 *** .12 *** .06 *** .12 *** .09 *** .15 *** .01 n.s. .00 n.s. -.03 ** .01 n.s. -.04 *** .04 *** .13 *** .12 *** .15 *** -.01 n.s.
*** p< .001, ** p <.01, * p<.05, n.s. = not significant; SD = Standard Deviation  
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The first sample contains all 201,885 listings and was used to test hypotheses H1, H3(a), and H4(a). Second, in 
order to test hypotheses H2, H3(b) and H4(b), a sample containing only fully-funded listings (i.e., a loan was 
created) was created, as only interest rates of fully funded listings can be bidden down. The third sample contains 
loans that are older than one year to avoid introducing a bias by including young loans that have not had time to 
become delinquent or default. Table 4 to Table 6 depict the sample description and correlations for all three samples. 
In order to test our hypotheses we performed hierarchical multiple linear regression using SPSS 17.0. This allows us 
to control for the influence of non-social capital variables on the dependent variables. The control variables are first 
introduced in model 1. In a second model, the social capital variables are entered. The resulting R2-change allows to 
see how much of the variance in the dependent variables can be explained by the SC variables. For all hypotheses, 
we tested for multicollinearity and autocorrelation. For all samples, the significant (at p<.001) Pearson correlations 
between the independent variables are all well below .8, the tolerance values are greater than 0.1 and VIF values less 
than 10; no multicollinearity problem among the predictors was found. Autocorrelation was checked as the data 
were collected over a time period of two and a half years. The Durbin-Waston values were well above 1.0 (most 
close to 2); no indication of autocorrelation was found. 
Results 
H1: Social capital has a positive influence on the likelihood of getting funded 
H1 asserts that everything else being equal, listings posted by borrowers with higher social capital have better 
chances of getting funded. We tested H1 with a linear regression model with social capital (SC) variables as the 
independent variables and the ratio of received bid amounts against requested as the dependent variable (DV). H1 is 
supported. SC variables account for 4.4% (adj. R2-Change, significant at p<.001) of the variation in the dependent 
variable; SC and control variables (Model 2) account for 35.2% of the variation (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Results for Testing Hypothesis H1 with Dependent Variable Likelihood of Getting Funded 
n = 201,885 (All Listings)
Credit Grade .545 *** .522 ***
Debt to Income Ratio -.041 *** -.044 ***
Is Borrower Homeowner -.013 *** -.011 ***
Borrower Maximum Rate .169 *** .173 ***
Amount Requested -.221 *** -.209 ***
Listing has Image .056 *** .042 ***
Length of Listing Description .113 *** .051 ***
Previous Successful Listings -.045 *** -.045 ***
Listing Duration .035 *** .019 ***
Group Rating .013 ***
Group Requires Listing Review .047 ***
No of Group Loans per Group Member .010 ***
Number of Lenders Supporting Group -.021 ***
Number of Endorsements .022 ***
Has Bid from Social Network .188 ***







Std. Error of the Estimate 28.630 27.719
F-statistic 9996.421 6843.127
Sig. .000 .000
Sig. F. Change .000 .000




(Control and SC Variables)
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Group rating is significant and positively related to the likelihood of getting funded as predicted which means that 
belonging to a higher rated group improves borrowers' chances of getting funded. Whether a group requires the 
listings of its group members to be reviewed is also positively related to the DV as is the weighted number of loans 
of a group. Endorsements increase the chance of getting funded as well as having bids from the social network. 
Being a group leader also improves chances of getting funded. Contrary to expected, the number of lenders 
supporting a group does not improve group member’s chances of getting funded. 
H2: Social capital reduces the interest rate a borrower is likely to obtain 
H2 asserts that everything else being equal, borrowers with more social capital are likely to get lower interest rates 
for their loans. H2 tests the influence of borrowers' social capital on the "spread above prime rate," the difference 
between the actual interest rates borrowers get and the prime rate reported by the Wall Street Journal. H2 is 
supported. SC variables account for 3.7% (adj. R2-Change, significant at p<.001) of the variation in the dependent 
variable; SC and control variables (Model 2) account for 52.0% of the variation (see Table 8). 
Group rating, required group listing review, number of lenders supporting group, has bid from social network, and is 
group leader are all negatively related to the DV, as hypothesized. These SC variables help borrowers to get lower 
interest rates. Some SC variables are related to DV in direction contrary to expected. The weighted number of loans 
of a group and the number of endorsements are positively related to the DV, suggesting that these social capital 
variables lead to higher interest rates. The positive influence of weighted number of loans could be explained that as 
group loans per member increase so does the payback burden on the borrowers belonging to this group. Although, 
lenders might prefer such a listing - as suggested in the results of H1 - they might request an additional risk 
premium. Please note that borrower maximum rate was removed from the analysis since it highly correlates with 
realized borrower rate – a variable that is part of the dependent variable. 
 
Table 8: Results for Testing Hypothesis 2 with Dependent Variable Spread above Prime Rate 
n = 27,633 (All loans)
Credit Grade -.773 *** -.792 ***
Debt to Income Ratio .022 *** .034 ***
Is Borrower Homeowner .041 *** .041 ***
Amount Requested .159 *** .170 ***
Listing has Image -.026 *** -.014 **
Length of Listing Description -.047 *** .001 n.s.
Previous Successful Listings -.058 *** -.055 ***
Listing Duration -.059 *** -.034 ***
Group Rating -.039 ***
Group Requires Listing Review -.051 ***
No of Group Loans per Group Member .011 *
Number of Lenders Supporting Group -.017 **
Number of Endorsements .017 ***
Has Bid from Social Network -.141 ***







Std. Error of the Estimate 5.442 5.244
F-statistic 3268.524 2020.072
Sig. .000 .000
Sig. F. Change .000 .000




(Control and SC Variables)
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H3: Social capital has an increasing influence with lower credit grade. 
H3 was tested using two models with different DVs: 
H3.a Dependent Variable: Likelihood of getting funded 
H3.b Dependent Variable: Spread above Prime Rate 
The first DV (H3.a) is the portion of a listing that is funded, used as a measure of the likelihood of getting funded; 
the second DV (H3.b) is the difference between actual loan interest rate and the prime rate, a measure of the interest 
rate a borrower may get. Both models were tested in seven different credit grade groups. Listings were grouped 
according to borrowers' credit grades. H3 asserts that the influence of the SC variables will get stronger as credit 
grades gets worse. The adj. R2- change when adding the social capital variables to the control variables of all seven 
groups is reported in Table 9. H3.a is supported. The adj. R2-change in H3.a is strictly increasing from credit group 
AA (1.6%), the best, to credit group HR (8.2%), the one considered most risky. Interestingly, the SC accounted R2 
increases and the full model R2 decreases as the credit grades get worse. Apparently, the influence of the SC 
variables picks up as credit degrades even when the full model becomes less and less influential. 





































Adj. R2 34.5% 1.6% 32.3% 3.1% 26.9% 3.7% 25.2% 5.4% 23.1% 6.8% 22.2% 6.9% 19.7% 8.2%
St. Error 35.086 - 36.870 - 38.040 - 36.599 - 32.488 - 25.502 - 17.931 -
F 208.521 - 227.089 - 277.598 - 459.960 - 591.068 - 695.176 - 1487.076 -
Sig. 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Sig. of Change - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.00 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
HRAA A B C D E
 
 
The analysis of H3.b is inconclusive (see Table 10). Although the adj. R2-change in the two highest risk groups E 
(10.9%) and HR (8.5%) are higher than those in the low risk groups AA (4.5%) and A (6.4%), the adj. R2-change in 
higher risk group D (5.4%) is lower than those in the lower risk group A (6.4%). 





































Adj. R2 42.7% 4.5% 31.1% 6.3% 20.3% 6.9% 10.4% 6.2% 8.1% 5.4% 13.4% 10.9% 10.3% 8.5%
St. Error 2.461 - 3.530 - 4.233 - 5.560 - 5.934 - 5.679 - 6.613 -
F 173.792 - 101.732 - 75.948 - 46.557 - 32.622 - 36.545 - 29.291 -
Sig. 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Sig. of Change - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.00 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
HRAA A B C D E
 
 
H4: Social capital has an increasing influence over time 
H4 was tested using the same two DVs as H3: 
H4.a Dependent Variable: Likelihood of getting funded 
H4.b Dependent Variable: Spread above Prime Rate 
In order to test hypothesis 4 we split our samples into 10 consecutive time groups from the second quarter in 2006 to 
the third quarter of 2008 and run hierarchical multiple regression for each of the groups. H4 asserts that the 
influence of the SC variables will get stronger over time as social capital has time to grow. H4 was not supported. 
The analysis shows that the influence of SC variables in both models increases with time in 2006 and early 2007 and 
then decreases. In H4.a, the adj. R2 (see Table 11) increases from 4.3% in Q2 to 2006 to around 5.8% until the first 
quarter in 2007, but then drop constantly to 1.5% in quarter 3 of 2008. In H4.b (see Table 12), the adj. R2 shows a 
similar n-shaped pattern, reaching a peak around mid-2007 then decreasing below the level of 2006. 
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Adj. R2 35.7% 4.3% 46.6% 5.9% 41.0% 5.8% 42.4% 5.8% 43.8% 4.4% 43.3% 3.3% 37.4% 2.4% 33.7% 1.7% 32.1% 1.5% 31.7% 1.5%
St. Error 26.681 - 27.149 - 26.480 - 28.543 - 25.432 - 23.529 - 23.685 - 28.059 - 29.857 - 29.916 -
F 385.073 - 625.074 - 773.961 - 820.468 - 1107.189 - 1163.966 - 1008.702 - 701.493 - 762.461 - 589.352 -
Sig. 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Sig. of Change - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
2007/Q4 2008/Q1 2008/Q2 2008/Q32006/Q2 2006/Q3 2006/Q4 2007/Q1 2007/Q2 2007/Q3
 




















































Adj. R2 67.2% 0.7% 67.2% 1.4% 57.9% 1.8% 72.5% 1.6% 65.6% 1.8% 68.8% 3.0% 59.1% 2.1% 54.5% 0.9% 49.4% 0.7% 59.1% 0.3%
St. Error 3.485 - 3.957 - 4.461 - 3.455 - 3.708 - 3.440 - 4.342 - 5.216 - 5.976 - 5.813 -
F 191.421 - 262.482 - 226.615 - 552.472 - 381.974 - 376.572 - 244.360 - 245.987 - 265.360 - 315.153 -
Sig. 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Sig. of Change - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
2008/Q1 2008/Q2 2008/Q32007/Q2 2007/Q32006/Q2 2006/Q3 2006/Q4 2007/Q1 2007/Q4
 
 
H5: Social capital of the borrower has a positive influence on loan payment 
H5 asserts that the more social capital a borrower has, the more likely the borrower will pay back their loan on time. 
We tested three models (see Table 13). The first model includes only the control variables. The second model 
includes all social capital variables we used in hypotheses 1-4. The third model includes an additional social capital 
variable that measures the stake a member of the borrower’s social network has in the loan (% of loan funded by 
social network). This variable was not included in the testing of hypotheses H1-H4 because lenders don’t know the 
winning bids before the auction ends and are not able to use these variables as decision factors. 
 
Table 13: Results for Testing Hypothesis H5 with Dependent Variable Loan Payment 
n = 14,418 (Loan Age > 12 Months)
Credit Grade .268 *** .269 *** .263 ***
Debt to Income Ratio -.007 n.s. -.009 n.s. -.009 n.s.
Is Borrower Homeowner -.038 *** -.040 *** -.040 ***
Borrower Maximum Rate -.152 *** -.147 *** -.153 ***
Amount Requested -.086 *** -.089 *** -.089 ***
Listing has Image .011 n.s. .005 n.s. .004 n.s.
Length of Listing Description .018 * .008 n.s. .008 n.s.
Previous Successful Listings -.034 *** -.032 *** -.032 ***
Listing Duration -.001 n.s. -.004 n.s. -.004 n.s.
Group Rating .034 ** .033 **
Group Requires Listing Review .006 n.s. .007 n.s.
No of Group Loans per Group Member -.019 * -.019 *
Number of Lenders Supporting Group -.017 n.s. -.018 n.s.
Number of Endorsements .042 *** .043 ***
Has Bid from Social Network -.001 n.s. .003 n.s.
Is Group Leader .026 ** .025 **







Std. Error of the Estimate 0.996 0.994 0.994
F-statistic 249.327 144.470 136.110
Sig. .000 .000 .000
Sig. F. Change .000 .000 .141
*** p< .001, ** p <.01, * p<.05, n.s. = not significant
Model 3





(Control and SC Variables 
H1-H4)
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H5 is partially supported. When the social capital variables are included, the gain in the adj. R2 is significant (Model 
2). However, the change is quite small (0.3%). Adding the additional variable, the percentage of loan funded by 
social network, did not significantly increase the explanatory power of our model (Model 3). Four social capital 
variables out of eight are insignificant (see Table 13, Model 3). Group rating, the number of endorsements, and is 
group leader are significant and have the predicted positive relationship with the dependent variable. Contrary to our 
prediction, the number of loans per group member (a proxy of the experience of the group) is significant but has a 
negative influence on loan payment. This again could be explained by the fact that the more group loans per group 
member a group has, the higher the payback burden on the borrowers of the group. This might suggest that the 
benefits of a bigger collective group knowledge is smaller than the negative effect of the higher payback burden of 
each group member. 
Discussion 
The empirical analysis showed that social capital does influence borrowers' ability to get funded and get better 
interest rates. In general, borrowers with more social capital tend to get funded and obtain lower interest rates. 
Moreover, the influences are different across credit grades and time. The most important insights gained from the 
analysis are discussed in this section. 
Social Capital's Different Importance for Different Borrower Groups 
An interesting finding is that social capital is not equally important for all borrower groups. Social capital seems to 
be more influential for borrowers with low credit grades (e.g., E, HR) than for those with high credit grades (e.g., 
AA, A) for both the likelihood of getting funded and obtaining better interest rate (see Table 9 and Table 10). More 
interestingly, for both dependent variables, the explanatory power of the full model (including economic and listings 
characteristics variables) decreases as credit grades get worse. This means that for high credit grade groups, the 
explanatory power comes largely from non-SC variables, and for low credit grade groups, the explanatory power 
comes largely from SC variables. This finding supports our argument that lenders use more social cues about a 
borrower to make investment decisions when his/her credit grade is low. 
The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) may provide an explanation for why the full model has less explanatory 
power as credit grades get worse. ELM explains attitude change as a result of two types of evaluation, that of issue-
relevant information such as the message itself, e.g., in our context what does the borrower say about why s/he needs 
the loan; and that of peripheral cues, e.g., in our context credit grade, debt-to-income ratio, or group membership 
(Petty and Cacioppo 1981). ELM posits that if a person does not have the motivation or ability to evaluate issue-
relevant information, s/he will rely on simple heuristics derived from peripheral cues due to less cognitive effort 
required (Corritore et al. 2003). Peripheral cues are thus factors that produce attitude change without the need to 
evaluate the listing content in detail. Our models test the influence of peripheral cues on lenders' decisions but do not 
incorporate other factors such as the contents of the listings (e.g., emotional influence of image, purpose of loan). 
We argue that in cases of good credit grades, lenders believe that risks are small and are likely to depend on 
peripheral cues to make decisions, hence the good explanatory power of our model. When the credit grades are low, 
risks are too high for lenders to depend on peripheral cues alone so that they turn to factors that are not included in 
the model, therefore the explanatory power of the model is low. 
Social Capital's Influence over Time 
The results show that the influence of social capital changes over time. However, surprisingly, social capital's 
influence on getting funded peaked in the first two quarters in 2007 and steadily declined afterwards - contrary to 
our hypothesis (see Table 11 and Table 12). With our current knowledge, our explanation can only be speculative 
and future research should focus on Prosper's group system. Anecdotal stories on Prosper related forums and blogs 
indicate that the implementation of the group system idea by Prosper might not have been ideal which in turn might 
have influenced our findings (e.g., forum www.prospers.org). For example, a Prosper member writes in an open 
letter to Prosper: "First, while there may be 1 or 2 groups out there somewhere in the 3600 Prosper groups which 
actually has the dynamic [Chris Larsen, Prosper's CEO] envisioned, 99.9% of them do not. Most are groups of 
people who don’t know each other at all. No commitment. No shame." (Fred93 2007). One main problem was 
apparently based on inappropriate group incentives (Anderson 2007; Fred93 2007). Until September 2007, group 
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leaders could receive a "group leader reward" for every loan created that was associated with his/her group. Some 
group leaders tried to promote and push loans that were of high risk to the lenders in order to increase their size and 
the group leader reward for themselves. Apparently, the group leader reward turned out to be a bad incentive. These 
bad loans might have damaged the reputation of groups on Prosper and might explain why fewer listings belonging 
to groups were created after the peak in the first two quarters in 2007 and might also partially explain why social 
capital gets less important over time. These events don't necessarily show that group and group membership are a 
bad idea in general in P2P lending marketplaces. However, it indicates that social networks need to be designed 
carefully with benefits for both, borrower and lenders in mind, as well as correctly and thoughtfully planned 
incentives to its group members. 
Influence of Social Capital on Loan Payment 
It was hypothesized that social capital helps to reduce delinquencies. However, the empirical results provide very 
limited support for that. Although the R2-change when adding the SC variables in hypothesis 5 is statistically 
significant, it is very low (see Model 2, Table 13). An R2-change of 0.3% means that by introducing social capital 
variables we can only explain an additional 0.3% of variance in loan performance. So, apparently although lenders 
include social capital cues of the borrower in their decision to bid on a listing, the same variables are not good 
predictors of whether the borrower is going to re-pay their loan. This might suggest that the benefits of groups 
reported from other contexts such as microcredits (Cassar et al. 2007; Karlan 2007) could not be translated into 
Prosper's P2P lending marketplace. It might be that borrower groups lack the kind of personal and face-to-face 
contact needed to develop the feelings of trust, obligations, and solidarity. Prosper's co-founder and CEO Chris 
Larsen states: "Credit markets have destroyed the sense of commitment and shame if you don't pay. [...] So we try to 
make sure buyers are tightly associated with a group, whose reputation is directly impacted by one person not 
paying. That should dramatically lower default costs." (Hof 2006). However, our results suggest that groups might 
not be a good replacement for institutional mechanisms such as efficient collection mechanisms and P2P lending 
marketplaces should not only rely on social networks for borrower obligation to payback a loan. Surprisingly, even 
when considering the stakes a borrower's close social network (friends, endorsement giver, group members, and 
group leaders) has in the loan, the explanatory power of the social capital variables did not increase (see Model 3, 
Table 13). Finally, our results also suggest that lenders should not only rely on social capital (groups and friends) 
when making their investment decisions. Clearly, better factors to assess borrower risks need to be developed for 
P2P lending marketplaces. 
Limitations and Disclaimer 
Our study has several limitations. First, we used archival data which might overlook salient factors. Second, we 
examined data from one single P2P lending marketplace. The results might not be readily transferable to other 
marketplaces, especially since other marketplaces might have other ways than groups or friend networks to connect 
their members. Third, we relied on quantitative measures only. A lender's decision to bid on a listing is likely to be 
more complex and involves qualitative measures, such as the purpose of the loan and the quality of the picture. A 
disclaimer to make is that we don't want to overstate the default rates and give misleading information to potential 
lenders and borrowers. Although the data is from a time span of two and a half years and should give reliable results,  
the real estate and credit crisis in 2008/2009 might have contributed to the high delinquency rates as well as caused 
the low R2 in hypothesis 5. 
Conclusion - The Role of Social Capital in P2P Marketplaces 
We empirically investigated the role of social capital using two and a half years of loan history from the largest P2P 
lending marketplace in the U.S. We found that, although social capital plays a role in this marketplace, the 
participants do not benefit equally from social capital. Borrowers, and especially high-risk borrowers, benefit most 
from social capital as they are more likely to get better chances of getting funded and obtain lower interest rates. 
However, social capital is apparently not a good predictor of loan payment and, hence, social capital does not 
necessarily help lenders in making better investment decisions. 
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